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Abstract 
 
 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is increasingly becoming a popular business 
concept in developed economies. As typical of other business concepts, it is on its 
way to globalization through practices and structures of the globalized capitalist 
world order, typified in Multinational Corporations (MNCs). However, CSR often sits 
uncomfortably in this capitalist world order, as MNCs are often challenged by the 
global reach of their supply chains and the possible irresponsible practices inherent 
along these chains. The possibility of irresponsible practices puts global firms under 
pressure to protect their brands even if it means assuming responsibilities for the 
practices of their suppliers. Pressure groups understand this burden on firms and try 
to take advantage of the situation. This paper seeks to challenge the often taken-for-
granted-assumption that firms should be accountable for the practices of their 
suppliers by espousing the moral (and sometimes legal) underpinnings of the 
concept of responsibility. Except where corporate control and or corporate grouping 
exist, it identifies the use of power as a critical factor to be considered in allocating 
responsibility in firm-supplier relationship; and suggests that the more powerful in 
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this relationship has a responsibility to exert some moral influence on the weaker 
party. The paper highlights the use of code of conducts, corporate culture, anti-
pressure group campaigns, personnel training and value reorientation as possible 
sources of wielding positive moral influence along supply chains. 
 
Key words: Responsibility, firm-supplier relationship, purchasing ethics, responsible 
supply chain management, corporate control and corporate group 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The stakeholder theory of corporate social responsibility (CSR) emphasises a broad 
set of social responsibilities for business. Stakeholders, as used in this theory, refer 
to those individuals or groups who may affect or are affected by the organisation 
(Freeman, 1984 and 1994; Clarkson, 1995). They include a wide variety of interests, 
and as suggested by Mullins (2002), may be grouped under six main headings: 
employees, shareholders, consumers, government, community and the environment, 
as well as groups such as suppliers, trade unions, business associates and even 
competitors. In this regard, CSR can be broadly defined as an organisation‘s 
commitment to operate in an economically and environmentally sustainable manner 
while recognising the interests of its stakeholders1.  
 
In line with this broader definition of CSR, global brands like Nike, GAP, Adidas and 
McDonalds are often under intense pressure from groups working for responsible 
                                                 
1
 http://www.cbsr.bc.ca/what_is_csr/index.cfm  visited on April 8, 2003 
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supply chain management. Much of this pressure is channelled through the supply 
chain, since the pressure groups sometimes find it difficult to reach the global brands 
directly. To this end, they rely on indirect tactics such as targeting the sourcing 
activities of these brands and their seeming exploitation of cheap labour conditions in 
developing countries. These attacks, which have been quite successful in recent 
times, hack on the reputation of these firms (e.g. Nike‘s case2). They engender 
negative public sentiments and invariably resentments towards the global brands 
following ―irresponsible‖ behaviours along their supply chain. These negative 
perceptions of firms persist, irrespective of the locus of the ―guilty‖ suppliers on the 
supply chain spectrum of the primary purchasing firm. This image tends to put firms 
under pressure to bear indefinite responsibilities for their wide and long supplier 
networks. Firms, therefore, do everything possible to protect their brands – including 
accounting for the seeming irresponsible behaviours of their suppliers, as shown in 
the current wave of social reports across industries.  
 
There seems to be widespread agreement on some form of corporate responsibility 
for social issues. Nevertheless, the critical question is how to define or limit the 
scope of such responsibility within the context of the operations of MNCs. The 
enormity of corporate multinational power makes this an urgent and important task. 
The general conception of corporate social responsibility is extra-legal (McWilliams 
and Siegel 2001). Apart from corporate social responsibility reports, firms including 
MNCs now appear to adhere to one code of conduct or the other. These codes are 
usually voluntary initiatives by the firms, either alone or in association with other 
firms in the same or similar industry. Sometimes, other participants such as pressure 
                                                 
2
 Nike and its subcontractors are often accused of inhumane labour and business practices in Asian factories 
where Nike products are made. See: Kasky v. Nike and its Implications for CSR 
http://www.csrpolicies.org/CSRResources/CSRBriefs/csrbriefs_nike.html visited May 26, 2004 
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groups and civil societies make input to the contents of such codes.  However, most 
corporate codes of conduct have not properly addressed the issue of defining the 
limit of corporate responsibility for the activities of another corporation. For instance, 
The Apparel Industry Code of Conduct for US-based clothing and accessories 
corporations imposes a ―duty‖ on such enterprises to ensure compliance with the 
code by their contractors, sub-contractors, suppliers and licensees.3 This is clearly a 
nebulous obligation. Does this ―duty‖ extend to all the levels and actors in the supply 
chain, irrespective of proximity or remoteness from the firm or MNC? Can the ―duty‖ 
be applied to a situation where the MNC is not even in a position to control or 
influence a ―member‖ of the supply chain? Is unlimited exposure to social 
responsibility a good idea for the business environment? How does social 
responsibility fit in with the concepts of corporate legal personality and independent 
existence of corporations? Is reconciliation possible? 
 
One of the negative consequences of this pressure approach towards CSR adopted 
by pressure groups is the tendency to (inadvertently) promote the false notion that 
CSR practice is restricted only to global big firms and brands. Since most of the firms 
along the supply chains are likely to be Small and Medium scale Enterprises (SMEs), 
this approach also exhibits the tendency of giving an inaccurate impression that 
SMEs are somehow shielded from engaging in CSR practices, which runs against 
the ethos of the CSR movement. In the contrary, there is a rising call for SMEs to 
participate in both CSR discourse and practice as well (Petts, 1998; Spence, 1999; 
Sarbutts, 2003).  This is where and why we think that arguing for and highlighting the 
limits of CSR practices along supply chains of global brands could be a way to curtail 
                                                 
3
 Code of Labour Practices for the Apparel Industry including Footwear, available at: 
http://www.cleanclothes.org/codes/ccccode.htm  [visited August 8, 2006] 
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the excesses of pressure groups and their antics, while urging for SMEs to be 
equally socially responsible. 
 
This paper, therefore, examines if firms should be responsible for the practices of 
their suppliers, the extent of this responsibility and how they could effectively 
translate such responsibilities, if any, into practice. The paper starts by situating firm-
supplier relationships within the broader context of firm buying behaviour; and from 
that context evaluates the responsibilities of firms as ‗customers‘ to their suppliers. 
Quite often, the fact that purchasing firms are customers is ignored in debates 
around responsible supply chain management. The paper does not focus on such 
ethical issues in purchasing as: deception, bribery, price rigging, unsafe products 
and public safety (Wood, 1996:185), since these are likely to arise from the internal 
environment of the purchasing firm and not necessarily from its relationship with the 
suppliers. In addition, it does not consider the intricacies of the economic dynamics 
characteristic of firm-supplier relationships. It focuses solely on espousing the moral 
(and sometimes legal) connotations of the concept of responsibility and what it 
means to be held responsible while relating these to firm-supplier relationships. In 
the main, the paper attempts to set limits to responsibility in a supplier relationship by 
introducing the concepts of corporate control and corporate grouping as critical 
factors.  
 
Responsibility as accountability: meaning, clarifications and exceptions 
 
From ancient times, philosophers have struggled to unravel the wealth of meanings 
embedded in the term ‗responsibility‘ or the expression ‗to be held responsible‘. The 
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term and the expression are both associated with the concept of morality. This is not 
surprising, since the claim of morally responsible agents is one of the distinguishing 
characteristics of human rationality (Eshleman, 2002).  A comprehensive account of 
the philosophy of responsibility, thus, encapsulates nuances of moral responsibility, 
the status of a moral agent and the conditions under which the actions of a moral 
agent may be considered responsible or irresponsible.   
 
In the history of western philosophy, substantive reflections on the notion of moral 
responsibility date back to the ancient Greek philosophers, especially Aristotle. In 
Nichomachean Ethics (BKIII), Aristotle considers the criteria for moral agency to 
include the capacity for rational choice and deliberation.  A responsible act is a 
voluntary act. Therefore, an agent is praiseworthy or blameworthy depending on his 
or her voluntary acts and disposition of character traits. For an act to qualify as a 
voluntary act, the agent must be both in full control of his or her action and must be 
rationally cognizant of the consequences of his or her action. Involuntary acts are 
thus those acts for which the agent should not be held responsible, either because 
they are executed out of ignorance, external coercion or to avoid a greater evil (Cahn 
2002).  However, contemporary western moral philosophy embodies varying and 
often conflicting notions of moral responsibility.  
 
The Kantian idea of moral responsibility also stems from the conception of person as 
a moral agent. A moral agent or person is not only rational or capable of rational 
choice, but is one whose action is informed by a sense of duty. The sense of duty is 
codified in universal law principles, which Kant referred to as categorical imperatives. 
Therefore, a responsible or right action is not necessarily one that maximizes utility, 
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but one that follows moral principles, which are capable of becoming universal moral 
laws (Cahn 2002:752). Hence, for neo-Kantians and some other deontologists, a 
responsible or good moral agent ought to act in accordance with good moral 
principles, irrespective of the consequences of such actions. The assumption here is 
that good moral principles lead to actions that invariably bring about good 
consequences. For consequentialists, however, a good or responsible action is one 
that brings about good consequences or maximizes utility (in the case of 
utilitarianism). Hence, the morality of an act is not dependent on moral principles 
prior to the action, but on the actual outcome of a particular act4.   
 
In another sense, to be responsible may involve some sort of cause and effect 
relationship (e.g. gravity responsible for the fall of objects in space) or carry some 
sort of duties and or obligations which could be legal and moral (e.g. an employed 
school teacher‘s responsibility to teach). Since ―…to be morally [and legally] 
responsible for something, say an action, is to be worthy of a particular kind of 
reaction – praise, blame [punishment] or something akin to these – for having 
performed it‖ (Eshleman, 2002:1), the latter applies more to our arguments in this 
paper than the former. Dwelling on the meaning of responsibility, the philosopher 
John Lucas (1993) wrote: 
 
Etymologically, to be responsible is to be answerable—it comes 
from the Latin respondeo, I answer, or the French répondre, as in 
                                                 
4
 Deontology is an ethical theory that stems from the notion of duty. It judges the rightness or 
wrongness of an act primarily from the point of view of a person‘s duties and the rights of others. This 
form of ethics separates the rightness or wrongness of a decision from its outcomes. In other words, 
an act is good, if it follows well-established moral principles. Hence, an agent‘s action can be wrong 
even if it results in the best possible outcome. Consequentialism, on the contrary, stresses that the 
moral value of an act is dependent upon the value of its consequences.  An act is good, if the 
resulting consequences are also good. (See also Blackburn, 1996, 77, 100) 
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RSVP. I can equally well say that I am answerable for an action or 
accountable for it. And if I am to answer, I must answer a question; 
the question is 'Why did you do it?' and in answering that question, 
I give an account [...] of my action. So the central core of the 
concept of responsibility is that I can be asked the question 'Why 
did you do it?' and be obliged to give an answer. 
 
In a similar effort, Craig (2000) defines ‗responsibility‘ as follows: 
 
To be responsible for something is to be answerable for it. We have 
prospective responsibilities, things it is up to us to attend to: these 
may attach to particular roles (the responsibilities of, for instance, 
parents or doctors), or the responsibilities we have as moral 
agents, or as human beings. We have retrospective responsibilities, 
for what we have done or failed to do, for the effects of our actions 
or omissions. Such responsibilities are often (but not always) moral 
or legal responsibilities.  
 
However, can one be answerable for an action that lies beyond one‘s control? What if 
one‘s psychological and physical conditions do not permit one to give an account of 
one‘s actions, who should be accountable in this case? These questions raise the 
fundamental challenges of fatalism and determinism in relation to the concept of 
―responsibility‖ and are beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Responsibility in the sense used in this paper is closely related to the concept of 
accountability. Drawing from the works of other academics (e.g. Gray et al. 1987; 
Williams 1987; Roberts and Scapens, 1985), Swift (2001:17) characterizes 
accountability in both broad and narrow sense. Broadly speaking, he describes 
accountability as "... the requirement or duty to provide an account or justification for 
one's actions to whomever one is answerable". In a narrow sense, Swift talks of 
accountability as "... being pertinent to contractual arrangements only,... where 
accountability is not contractually bound there can be no act of accountability". 
Furthermore, borrowing from a later work of Gray et al (1997), Swift notes that "... 
essentially accountability is about the provision of information between two parties 
where the one is accountable, explains or justifies actions to the one to whom the 
account is owed". This form of accountability underlies principal-agent relationship, 
which is central to the firm as an economic and legal entity. Despite the presence of 
semantic variations within the notion of accountability, the duty to account appears to 
convey a central meaning. The duty to account connotes institution of rights and 
obligations and as such, should be able to hurt if violated (Owen et al., 2000).  
 
In the same line of thought, Gray et al. (1988) explain that a firm's accountability to 
the wider society is inherent in a social contract between the society and the 
business group. The appropriation of the social contract theory here stems from the 
hypothesis that business derives its existence from the society. Although traditional 
social contract theories are hypothetical constructs, nevertheless, they are normative 
reference points in the justification of the legal use of coercive state or societal power 
on individual citizens and corporations. This idea of accountability inherent in the 
social contract is realized when market forces punish or reward corporate behaviour 
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(Swift, 2001; Donaldson and Preston, 1995). In this regard, Korten (2004) argues 
that the market by necessity needs information to be effective. Hence, corporations 
have the moral duty to produce necessary and complete information needed by the 
market to mete out punishment or dispense reward. This will constitute accountability 
to the market, which cannot be achieved through self-regulation. 
 
The increasing demand for accountability from firms also extends to the activities 
within their supply chain (Mamic, 2005). This extension of responsibility, in itself, is 
questionable: Is the supply chain of a firm intrinsically part of the firm? If it is, what 
becomes of the independence of the individual firms operating within a primary firm‘s 
supply chain? If it is not, is it appropriate to expect firms to account for actions 
outside their legal boundaries, thereby exposing them to ―unlimited‖ responsibility for 
their supply chains? Why should one firm bear responsibilities for the practices of 
another firm? Are ‗consumers‘ responsible for the practices of the firms (e.g. 
supermarkets) they buy from? Are suppliers (in our case the supermarkets) not 
pressured to be responsible and ethical to the consumers at the micro-level 
(individual buying behaviour)? These questions assume more challenging postures, 
especially in cases where relationships between firms and the suppliers are 
fundamentally economic and at arms length (Sako, 1992). As such, we see the 
apparent ascription of unlimited responsibility to account for suppliers‘ practices on 
the purchasing firms as inappropriate because it undermines corporate autonomy 
and independence.  
 
In most legal systems, a corporation is recognised as a legal person. The principle of 
independent legal existence of a corporation recognises that a corporation is distinct 
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from its members or shareholders. A corporation is regarded as neither an arm nor 
an extension of its members or shareholders. In Dartmouth College v Woodward a 
corporation was described as ―an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing 
only in contemplation of law‖. Corporate personality is now an established principle 
in most legal systems. Various decisions of the United States Supreme Court, for 
instance, Santa Clara County v Southern P.R. Co (1886), First National Bank v 
Belotti (1978), consistently confirmed the legal personality of corporations. 
Furthermore, the twin principles of corporate personality and separate legal 
existence of a corporation are the ―…cornerstone of English company law [and] a 
fundamental rule‖ (McGee et al., 2005:99). An important component of these twin 
principles is the principle of limited liability under which the liability of the 
shareholders or members of a corporation is limited only to the value of their 
shareholding (Salomon v Salomon & Co.: 1897). In other words, it could be argued 
that the supply chain is not an extension of the firm and as such, the purchasing firm 
should not bear any responsibilities for the practices of its suppliers. Suppliers, as 
firms, should bear responsibility for their actions. However, these are the general 
legal rules. In practice, there are exceptions to the general rules - for example, where 
there are some sorts of integrations – i.e. vertical or horizontal and even network – 
between the purchasing and supplying firms.  To substantiate our argument for these 
exceptions, we draw insights from two related concepts in law – (a) control as 
limitation of corporate liability and (b) corporate group. These two concepts are, 
practically, exceptions to the twin principles of corporate legal personality and 
separate existence of a corporation. 
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Control 
 
Relevant statutes usually contain their definitions of control (e.g. section 231 of the 
UK Employment Rights Act, 1996). Corporate control may exist in various forms. For 
example, where the management of one corporation can be appointed or removed 
by the management of another corporation, control appears to be in existence. In a 
situation, where a corporation has no assets at all or has no assets within its area of 
operation and relies on the assets of the other corporation to do business, or where 
a corporation engaged in a ―risky‖ venture sells its assets to a corporation in the 
same group (for example, Patrick Case: Spender, 2000: 38-43), corporate control 
may exist here too. The Australian Patrick Case illustrates this point. In that case, 
four members of a stevedoring group sold their business and other assets to another 
member of the group. The only asset left in each of the selling companies was a 
contract to supply labour to an upstream company in the same group. The upstream 
company later terminated this contract for supply of labour. The termination of that 
contract directly resulted in the insolvency of the four companies. 
 
However, prior to the group restructuring, each member of the group employed its 
own workers, owned and operated its own stevedoring business. It was later pointed 
out that the main reason for the restructuring exercise was to ―facilitate the 
termination of the employees‘ employment‖ (Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty 
Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (1998): 673; Spender, 2000:40). One other 
important result of the restructuring was that the same individual became the sole 
director of each of the four labour-supply companies. The applicable Australian 
Corporation Law, s.221 permitted sole directorship (Spender, 2000: 40). The overall 
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effect was that ―[a]lthough the legal entities who contracted with the employees did 
not change, the nature of the business and the viability of those companies had 
changed fundamentally‖ (Spender, 2000: 41). The workers‘ union instituted an action 
against the corporate group (Maritime Union of Australia v Patrick Stevedores 
Operations No. 1 Pty Ltd (1998); Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v 
Maritime Union of Australia (1998)). An interlocutory injunction was granted against 
the members of the corporate group by both the court of first instance and the 
appellate court compelling the companies to treat the four labour-supply companies 
as their sole suppliers of labour. The companies were also required to treat the 
labour supply agreements as subsisting and valid (Spender, 2000: 55).  However, 
the litigation ended at the interlocutory stage when the parties reached settlement. 
The terms of settlement included the winding-up of the four labour-supply 
companies; the transfer of the workers‘ employment to the group holding company; 
and the termination of the labour supply contracts (Spender: 55).  In England today, 
it would not be possible for the kind of restructuring carried out by the Patrick group 
to dispense with the services of the employees of the four associated companies. 
The introduction of the concept of ―associated employer‖ by section 231 of the 
Employment Rights Act 1996 prevents such actions (Milman, 1999: 237).  According 
to that statutory provision, two employers are associated if ―one is a company of 
which the other (directly or indirectly) has control, or both are companies of which a 
third person (directly or indirectly) has control‖. This statutory provision is a clear 
case of disregard of the principle of independent existence of corporations. 
 
Examples of such control may also exist where the businesses belong to the same 
corporate group or there is a parent-subsidiary relationship. In Bowoto v Chevron the 
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claimants sued Chevron (now ChevronTexaco) for human rights abuses and for 
issuing false and misleading information on its practices in Nigeria under a military 
regime. In March 2004, the US (federal) District Court in San Francisco, California, 
rejected Chevron‘s arguments that (1) Nigeria is the proper forum for the trial of the 
case, (2) the alleged human rights abuses did not violate international law, and (3) 
Chevron could not be held responsible for the actions of its Nigerian subsidiary. In 
effect, in Bowoto v Chevron the court ruled that separate personality of a subsidiary 
corporation does not constitute a bar to holding a corporation accountable for the 
actions of their overseas subsidiaries.  The relevant control may also exist where, as 
in Cape Industries v Adams (1990), the corporation knew of the ―risks‖ but took steps 
to establish an asset-free undertaking for the ―risky‖ business.  In 1968, Cape 
Industries closed its main UK factory as a result of the concerns for and the 
prevalence of asbestos related disease, although its South African operations 
continued in such unsafe environment until 1979 (Meeran, 2000: 263).  The relevant 
South African and Namibian labour compensation laws provided only ―a system of 
paltry compensation‖ and also precluded ―claims against the employer‖ (Meeran, 
2000: 252). 
 
Limitation of corporate liability is an issue of ―compelling theoretical interest and 
practical importance‖ (Hohfeld, 1909: 320). The exception to our general proposition 
of limiting responsibility to direct suppliers is where there is evidence of actual control 
by one corporation over another in the supply-chain irrespective of their positions on 
the chain. Control may mean either ―checking and supervising‖ or ―determining-the-
outcome‖ (Vagts, 1980: 324). The first is control at the lower level while the second 
is a higher-level control. In this paper, we adopt the higher level of control as the 
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relevant factor. First, the level of ―determining-the-outcome‖ requires less inquiry of 
details than ―checking‖ or ―supervising‖. Secondly, the usual relationship of firms is at 
that higher level, although it is possible for a firm to be involved in the details of the 
operations of another firm.  
 
―Determining-the-outcome‖ is connected to the setting and monitoring of a general 
policy framework. Being in a position to set or monitor such policies is as good as 
actually setting or monitoring them. Where this control exists, the indication is that 
the relationship between the corporations is not a normal ―arms-length‖ business 
relationship. Using control as the relevant factor for imposing responsibility has the 
distinct advantage of ensuring that a corporation does not avoid responsibility where 
such responsibility should be assumed. Otherwise, ‗careful‘ supply-chain 
organisation may be capable of completely defeating the aims of CSR. Nothing 
prevents a corporation from establishing a supply-chain relationship, which ensures 
that the ―risky‖ venture is carried out by an enterprise even lower than the direct 
supplier.  
 
 
Corporate Groups 
 
Corporations are generally permitted to own shares in other corporations. Corporate 
groups exist as a result of the ownership of shares by corporations in other 
corporations. The allocation of responsibility is one of the most controversial aspects 
of the law relating to corporate groups (Milma, 1999: 224). There is a growing trend 
towards a departure from the strict application of the principles of corporate 
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personality and separate corporate existence in the context of corporate groups. This 
approach appears to have influenced some English statutory provisions on corporate 
groups (Littlewoods Mail Order Stores v Inland Revenue Commissioners (1969): 
1241) such as consolidated accounts (Companies Act, 1985, s.227), disclosure 
requirements (Companies Act, 1985, ss.231, 232) and business report (Companies 
Act 1985 s.234 (as amended by Part 1 of Company (Audit Investigations and 
Community Enterprise) Act 2004). Why should this legal approach not be extended 
to corporate social responsibility?  
 
We advocate a single enterprise view of corporate groups. Single enterprise is an 
approach that treats the members of a corporate group as the same corporation. 
This approach reflects the actual and commercial reality of and in the operations of 
corporate groups. A suggestion has rightly been made for responsibility where ―there 
is sufficient involvement in, control over and knowledge of the subsidiary operations‖ 
(Meeran, 2000: 261). It appears that the trend is for corporations to be willing to 
argue in favour of separate companies as constituting a single economic unit 
whenever this may confer a perceived benefit, including right of action (an argument 
that was rejected by the court in The Albazero (1977)), profit or tax or other fiscal 
incentives (for instance, in ICI v Colmer (1998) and Bosal Holding BV (2003). 
However, there appears to be a change in corporate attitude when social 
responsibility is in issue. For instance, in Bhopal Case (1986, 1987), the defendant 
parent company disputed the argument of both the Indian government and the 
claimants that the parent was liable for the environmental disaster in issue 
regardless of the apparent legal separation between the parent and its Indian 
subsidiary. 
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It is important to recognize corporate groups as ―a form of business organisation sui 
generic‖ (Milman, 2000: 219). One should not be oblivious of the fact that some 
corporations are ―mere instrumentalities‖ (Amoco Cadiz (1984): 338) of other 
enterprises. There is no need to insist on the separate legal existence of the 
individual corporations in a corporate group. Such insistence on independent 
existence of the individual companies is certainly ―not a true reflection of the 
economic reality [since] very often such groups are so intertwined with each other‘s 
affairs as to amount to little more than departments of one organisation or entity‖  
(McGee, Williams and  Scanlan, 2005: 105). Artificialities are encouraged where the 
legal principle of separate existence is applied to corporate groups. For example, it is 
definitely not ―the most honest way‖ of doing business where there is ―the creation or 
purchase of a subsidiary with minimal liability which will operate with the parent‘s 
funds and on the parent‘s directions but not expose the parent to liability‖ (Atlas 
Maritime Co. v Avalon Maritime Ltd (No 1), (1991): 779). In most cases of parent-
subsidiary relationship, evidence shows that ―subsidiaries are bound hand and foot 
to the parent company and must do just what the parent company says‖( DHN Food 
Distributors Ltd v London Borough of Tower Hamlets, (1976): 860). The fact is that 
most historical accounts, (for instance, Hovekamp, 1991: 49-54) of the principle of 
separate existence of corporations strongly indicate that the principle was designed 
for the protection and encouragement of the individual shareholder, and not the 
corporate shareholder. In our view, therefore, firms in a dominant or controlling 
position in a corporate group should also be responsible for the activities of other 
firms in the group.  
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Power and Influence 
 
A further probing into the different scenarios presented above resonate with what 
comes across as a common assumption that the more powerful in an economic 
relationship should bear the responsibilities of the weaker party (Reed, 1999). On 
one hand, firms are readily perceived as more powerful than their suppliers, and 
consequently expected to assume responsibility for the practices of their suppliers.  
On the other hand, it is very plausible to conjecture that firms may also exert undue 
pressures on their suppliers thereby forcing them to conform to their low cost targets 
at the expense of responsible business practices. As such, a firm‘s exercise of power 
over the supplier may have either a deontological or consequentialist outlook.  Firms 
that enforce principles of responsible business practice from the standpoint of moral 
duty do so from a deontological perspective, while those that implement such 
principles in other to maximize profit do so from a consequentialist view point. Using 
the example of the suppliers of UK clothing retailers, Jones and Pollitt (1998) show 
that an opportunistic abuse of power by retailers can lead to reductions in quality, 
lack of investment, lack of innovation, and even job loses and industry decline 
(Crane and Matten, 2004).   
 
Considering the enormity of corporate multinational power, encouraging responsible 
practices within their business networks would still count as a moral minimum. Since 
firms (especially multinational corporations) wield a lot of power – given the vast 
resources available at their disposal, it is morally justifiable and more sensible to 
expect them to use their powers in a way that encourages suppliers to adhere to 
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some reasonable standards of responsible practices. However, the responsible use 
of power applies to both the firm and the supplier given their relative power positions 
in the market (i.e. the powerful supplier – monopoly; and the powerful buyer - 
monopsony).  But this influence, we suggest, should be limited to the interface 
between the firms and their immediate suppliers. Our primary assumption here is 
that through ripple effects, the influence of the powerful firm will filter down the entire 
spectrum of the supply chain.  
 
 
Translating responsibility in supply chains into practice: some managerial 
suggestions 
 
The translation of responsibility in supply chains into practice will involve some sort 
of change management – as the status quo will be altered. Covey (1992) in his 
seminal book: The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People suggests that it is essential to 
make the distinction between circle of control and circle of influence in any change 
management initiative. The circle of control relates to things we have complete 
control over, while circle of influence relates to things we can seek to influence, but 
do not have total control over. Following our position that purchasing firms should not 
bear ―indefinite‖ responsibilities for the actions of the suppliers and that firms in 
position of power should seek to positively, influence the practices of their suppliers, 
it implies that firms can only act within their circle of influence while dealing with their 
suppliers. Some of the possible ways of exerting this influence may include amongst 
   Page 20 of 32 
others: corporate codes of conduct/standards, corporate culture, anti-pressure group 
campaigns5 and personnel development. 
 
The codes of conduct/ standards will state in clear terms the value orientation of 
the purchasing firm and its expectations from the suppliers. This can be mapped out 
in consultation with the direct suppliers or as an agreement between firms and new 
suppliers at the point of engagement. This form of consultation should be free from 
any form of stakeholder imperialism - a relationship whereby the stakeholders are 
only accorded instrumental values, solely for economic gains. Stakeholder 
imperialism does not give a voice to stakeholders and is characterised by unilateral 
communication (Crane and Livesey, 2003) and unequal balance of power. It is not 
genuine; it is selfish and firms involve in it because ―… it makes good business 
sense … (and)… helps companies to mitigate risk, protect corporate brand, and gain 
competitive advantage… (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, 2002:2 cited in Brown and 
Fraser, 2004).  Rather the consultation should be characterised by genuine 
intentions, dialogue, engagement, trust and fairness (Phillips, 1997; Swift, 2001).  
Firms engaging in this form of consultation understand that stakeholder-ship entails 
some form of intrinsic value. They enter into such a relationship for some ends that 
transcend the mere calculation and maximization of profits.  It will then be the 
responsibilities of these immediate suppliers to pass on to their subsequent suppliers 
down the supply chain, the culture of responsible business practice.  
 
The principal purchasing firm can as well institute a process that asks for periodic 
submission of ethical audit reports from the suppliers as part of the engagement and 
                                                 
5
 The anti-pressure group campaign option is basically geared towards the global firms reclaiming power from the 
pressure groups and shifting public attention to the responsibilities of firms within their supply chains, and the 
need for them to be held accountable for their practices as independent firms with legal and moral rights/duties. 
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ensure that any supplier found guilty either by the auditors and, or by the public, 
would be named and shamed, which might even lead to the severance of 
relationship. In the same line of thought, purchasing firms can set up some sort of 
rewards for suppliers that continually meet the standards. Commenting on the 
relevance of the code of conduct in socially responsible supply chain management, 
Graafland (2002:283) gives an account of how it is used in C&A6: 
 
The code requires that suppliers respect the ethical standards of 
C&A in the context of their particular culture. Suppliers should have 
fair and honest dealings with all others with whom they do 
business, including employees, sub-contractors and other third 
parties. In addition to this general requirement, the code specifies 
detailed requirements related to employment conditions. For 
example, the use of child labour is absolutely unacceptable. 
Workers must not be younger than the legal minimum age and not 
less than 14 years. Wages must be comparable with local norms 
and comply with local laws. Furthermore, the code requires that 
suppliers make full disclosure to C&A of all facts concerning 
production and the use of sub-contractors. The suppliers are 
obliged to authorise [the auditors] to make un-announced 
inspections of the manufacturing facility. 
 
According to Graafland, C&A (in the above example) severed relationships with 
suppliers that did not conform to the code.  
                                                 
6
 C&A is a brand name 
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Another possible way for a powerful firm to positively influence less powerful firms in 
its network is to serve as a role model to others through its ethical organisational 
culture. According to McIntyre (1984), virtue is lived and not acted since one does 
not offer what one does not possess (nemo dat quod non habet). In this regard, 
Drumwright (1994) asserts that the success of socially responsible buying is to a 
large extent dependent on the organisational context within which the policies are 
made. In other words, to be able to influence the suppliers effectively the purchasing 
firm should exhibit high level of ethical orientation that is permeated in its culture. 
Culture is to an organisation what personality is to an individual. It is that distinctive 
formation of beliefs, values, work styles, and relationships (visible/invisible, 
said/unsaid) that distinguish one organisation from another (Schein, 1985:9). 
However, as there is abnormal personality, there is also supposed to be bad 
organisational culture. But what determines a good or bad culture? In our opinion, a 
good organisational culture is one that embodies these ethical dimensions of virtue, 
rights, justice, and utilitarianism. The presence or absence of these ethical 
dimensions determines the organisation‘s ability to base its decisions, policies, 
systems and processes on what is good and what is right (what ought to be) for its 
own sake (i.e. for the good of the society at large). This way, the purchasing firm will 
effectively serve as a role model to supplying firms for others to mimic. And theory 
confirms that firms have very high tendency to mimic each other, especially 
successful ones (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). 
 
A possible third option for a powerful firm to influence its supply chain is through 
personal training and value orientation. Crane and Matten (2004) distinguish two 
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sets of ethical issues that arise in business-supplier relationship, viz. organisational 
level issues and individual level issues. At the organisational level are such issues as 
misuse of power, the question of loyalty, conflicts of interests and preferential 
treatments. At the individual levels are such issues as bribery, unethical negotiation 
and other personal factors. While some of the organisational issues can be 
addressed through the organisational culture, the individual level issues can be 
influenced through personnel training in ethics and values. The purchasing firm can 
go a step further to extend this sort of training programmes to the staff of their 
suppliers in order to minimise the rate of value frictions at the point of transaction. 
That way, both firm and suppliers will enjoy more lasting relationship and earn higher 
social capital base. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
With the emergence of supranational economic ideologies in the West, under the 
auspices of globalisation, the dream of a deregulated global economic space is 
becoming a reality. Hence, MNCs rival existing nation-states in the control of 
economic resources in the world. In this sense, MNCs are legitimate agents of 
justice and injustice, and therefore liable to the same international principles 
governing economic and social corporations among states.  However, multinational 
corporations often operate under intricate economic, social and legal conditions 
within the territories of their subsidiary firms. Complex business laws and business 
structures differ from country to country, undermining the applicability of any 
emergent universal, moral-economic principles. These prevalent conditions, critics 
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say, often allow multinationals the free moral space to maximize profits and trump 
existing ethical obligations.  
 
We acknowledge that the aim of the paper, as demonstrated, raises some moral 
issues. Some pertinent questions that keep resonating beyond our collective 
academic exercise, are: why limit the scope of responsibility of MNCs? Does limiting 
their scope of responsibility make CSR more effective along the supply chain or does 
it create a larger, free moral space for MNCs to perpetrate irresponsible acts? While 
these questions are important, it is not surprising that the global firms are currently 
under pressure more than ever to rescue their brands from possible charges of 
misconducts along their supply chain.  The pressure groups understand this 
pressure and try to make the best use of it. It may not be surprising, also, to learn 
that sometimes, the pressure groups use these opportunities to promote their 
agenda (e.g. the case of Shell and Greenpeace is well documented in the business 
ethics literature7.  
 
Although Emmelhainz and Adams (1999) argue that the shift towards global supply 
and competition comes with extended chain of responsibility on the part of individual 
firms, it will be theoretically inappropriate to hold any particular firm responsible for 
the practice of another firm; unless it is established that the action of one firm 
consequentially leads to the action of another particularly where the relationship is 
not at arms-length (e.g. through the concepts of control and corporate grouping as 
earlier discussed in the paper). However, since firms are rational and free entities, 
this consequential link of actions and responsibilities will be more sensible where 
                                                 
7
 For example see: Bowie and Dunfee ( 2002) and Zyglidopoulos (2002). 
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there is an obvious misuse of power on either of the parties involved. If not, it is our 
opinion that each firm should bear responsibilities for its actions, albeit those in 
position of power have the deontological duty to use power responsibly and the 
obligation to positively influence the weaker parties possibly by setting standards, 
serving as role models, anti-pressure group campaigns and through personnel 
training and value orientation. 
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